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Singapore's formal pension system includes several elements including a non-
contributory public employees scheme and social assistance for the elderly.  The main
source of mandatory retirement savings however, is the Central Provident Fund or
CPF which also includes a variety of other forced savings programs covering housing,
medical  savings and  other  social objectives.  This  paper  focuses  on the  defined
contribution scheme whose role it is to provide income during retirement.  Despite a
high level of service and efficiency, the CPF has historically generated low returns to
individuals under a centralized and opaque investment regime.  This threatens to leave
many old persons in Singapore with  insufficient savings when they retire.  Recent
initiatives to allow contracting out of the investment with unit trusts and liberalization
of investment rules may eventually provide the risk-return combination required for a
funded pension  scheme.  At the same time,  a  public information campaign and a
strengthening  of  regulations  will  help  ensure  that  individuals  are  able  to  take
advantage of these reforms.
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Singapore  is an affluent  city  state  with the 1997  per capita  income  of its resident
population  of US $ 32,940  (US  $ 29,000  in PPP terms),  the fourth  highest  in the world
(The  World Bank, 1998,  Table 1, pp.190-191). 2 In rmid-1998,  its total population  was 3.87
million,  while  its resident  population,  comprising  citizens  and permanent  residents,  was
3.16  million  (Singapore,  Department  of Statistics,  1999,  Table  2.1,  p-3).  The short-term
foreign  population  thus accounts  for 18.2  per cent of the total population,  and 22.2
percent  of the resident  population'.
The growth rate of the resident  population  has been around  2.0 percent per
annum  in recent  years.  This  is  the result  of significant  net inmmigration  as  the total fertility
rate (TR) has been below  the replacement  level  since  1975.  In 1997,  the TFR was 1637
(2100  is needed for the population  to replace  itself),  while  the corresponding  Gross
Reproduction  Rate  (GRR)  was 787  (Singapore,  Department  of Statistics,  1998,  Table  1.9,
P.9).
The median  age  of the resident  population  has increased  from 28.3  years  in 1987
to 32.6  years  in 1997  ; while  the dependency  ratio  (residents  under  15  years  and those  60
years  and over  divided  by the residents  aged  15-59  years)  over  the same  period  increased
from 47.6  to 48.7 (Singapore,  Department  of Statistics,  1998,  Tables  1.8 and 1.9 ,P.9).
The  proportion  of resident  population  over  60 years  of age  increased  from 8.5  percent  of
the  total  in 1987  to 10.1  percent  in 1998,  while  the corresponding  share  of those  under 14
X  Author  is Associate  Professor  of Econoniics  and Public  Policy,  National  University  of
Singapore  10,  Kent  Ridge  Crescent  Singapore  119260
2  Note:  All  dollars,  unless  otherwise  noted,  are  in Singapore  dollars.  In rmid-April  1999,  US  $ 1=
S  $ 1.70.
4years  declined  from  23.7  percent  in  1987  to  22.7  per  cent  in  1997.  (Singapore,
Department  of statistics,  ,  1998, Table  3.3 , P.24). As a result, the  old age dependency
(those  60 years  and  over divided  by those  15-59 years of age ) has increased  from  12.6
percent in 1987 to  15.0 percent  in 1997. It is estimated that by the year 2030, 29.4 percent
of the resident  population  of Singapore will be above  60 years of age, while the  elderly
dependency ratio wiul  increase to 43.9 percent  (Appendix Table  1). Moreover, the average
annual rate of population  growth has begun to exceed average annual rate of labour force
growth and this trend  is expected to accelerate (Appendix Table  1).
In  1998, the  number  of "old-old"  (i.e. those  above  75 years of age) was about
86,000, little over quarter of those  above 60 years of age.  Life expectancy at birth  in 1997
was 75.0 years for  males and  79.2 years for  females (Singapore, Department  of Statistics,
1998, Table  1.11, P.10). Republic  of Singapore, Department  of Statistics, 199, p.4). It is
well established  that the  "old-old"  require long -term  care which is quite labor  intensive
and which  significantly impacts on  health  care costs.  Since the current  retirement age is
62 (which is to  be gradually increased to  67 years), average retiree will require retirement
financing for a considerable period of time.
It  is  in  the  above  context  that  this  paper  analyses Singapore's  social  security
arrangements.  Singapore finances its social security system through  a mandatory,  publicly
managed,  defined  contribution  (DC)  system  based  on  individual  accounts.  The  main
vehicle embodying  this  is the  Central  Provident  Fund  (CPF).  It  is a  Statutory  Board
under  the  Ministry  of  labor.  The  Board  members  of  the  CPF  are  drawn  from  the
employers,  unions,  government  representatives,  and  professional  experts.  They  are
appointed  by the Minister  of Labor.  In addition,  Singapore has a stringent  means-tested
public  assistance  scheme  which  is  officially designed  to  provide  less  than  minimum
subsistence level of income2.
There are two other pension systems operating in Singapore which deserve a brief
mention.  The  first  is  the  non-contributory  pension  scheme  for  the  government
employees.  Until  1973, all  government  employees  were  eligible to  be  in  the  pension
5scheme. However, in the  1973 and 1987 conversion exercises, pensionable employees
working at that time were given a choice to shift to the CPF scheme. The response was
mixed,  with some employees  electing  to stay  with the pension scheme,  while some shifted
to the CPF scheme.  At present, only new officers  in the designated pensionable services
(Administrative service, Police  (Senior) and  intelligence service), and  the  political
appointees are on the  pension  scheme. As  at January 31,  1999, there were  19,000
pensioners. Their number is expected to  decline over time as restrictions on who is
eligible  for a pension become fully  effective.  In 1997-98,  the government expenditure  on
gratuities and pensions was $  569.5 million, equivalent to  3.7 percent  of  operating
expenditure or  17.9 percent  of  the  expenditure on  manpower. The  pensionable
employees may choose monthly  pension until  death,  a  lump  sum  payment, or  a
combination of the two.
Since 1995, the government has set up a separate Pension Fund. The original
contribution to  the  fund  was made from  the  accumulated budgetary surpluses. In
addition, there is an annual contribution from the budget to the fund. As at 31 March
1998,  the Pension Fund had balances of $ 11, 657 million,  slightly  less than the $ 11, 770
million  in the previous year.
It  should be stressed that in spite of the setting up of the Pension Fund, the
Government Pension scheme is essentially  non-contributory,  unfunded scheme,  with the
pension benefits being paid on Pay As you Go (PAYG)  basis. This philosophy is indeed
in sharp contrast to the philosophy of the CPF scheme. Since  the top policy  makers and
politicians  are in the pension scheme, their pension benefits are determined on the basis
of a different philosophy than that of the rest of the population.
The second pension scheme deserving a  brief mention is the provident fund
scheme for the  certain categories of Armed forces personnel called the  Savings and
Employees  Scheme (the "Saver Scheme").  This scheme came into existence  as a result of
an amendment  to Singapore's  constitution  passed on March 20, 1998.
6This Fund is to be managed by a Board of Trustees appointed by the Armed
Forces Council, with  inputs  from  professional fund  managers and  the  Monetary
Authority of  Singapore, the  country's de-facto Central Bank. Unlike pensions, the
balances in the Fund will not be taxed; there will be no salary  ceiling  on contributions;
and those belonging  to the Fund will continue to enjoy  post-retirement medical  benefits
as before.
This scheme  is more generous  than the CPF scheme as it is designed  to encourage
military  officers  to stay in service for 20-25  years and retire at age 40-45, with benefits
similar  to those outside  the services  retiring at age  55. Essentially,  the scheme  provides  for
benefits equivalent  to  10-12  percent (20 percent for super scale officers)  of an officer's
gross monthly income to be deposited  into an officer's  account which can be withdrawn
after  serving a  specified period  of  time. This  is  in  addition to  the  normnal  CPF
contribution by employers.
The above two pension schemes notwithstanding,  analysing  the social security
system in Singapore  therefore requires a thorough assessment  of the CPF. This task is
undertaken in Section II. This is followed  by a discussion  of reform options which could
help provide adequate level of retirement protection to the population in a sustainable
manner  while maintaining Singapore's international competitiveness for  attracting
requisite  investments,  and professional  and technical  manpower.II. THE  CPF:  AN ASSESSMENT
The  CPF  was set up  by the  British  colonial  administration  under  the  Central
Provident  Fund  Act  which  came  into  force  on  July  1,  1955.  Currently,  only  those
employees  who  are  Singapore  citizens  and  permanent  residents  are  required  to  be
contributors  to  the  CPF.  Foreign  workers,  including  professional  expatriates  are  not
required, and pension contributions by them or their employers are not tax deductible.
The  CPF,  being  a  provident  fund,  is based  on  individual  accounts  which  are
portable,  remaining with the  employee through  job transitions.  The  entire  accumulated
balances  belong  to  the  member's  estate  at death,  but  are not  subject  to  estate  duties.
Members  of the CPF get annual account statements. A telephone hotline  allows members
to check on their accounts' status at any time.
Since  1955 , but  particularly since  1968, the  Singapore government  has  vastly
expanded the  scope  of the CPF  to  achieve a wide variety of social, political, and  other
objectives. These  include home  ownership, pre-retirement  investments,  life, home,  and
health  insurance,  and  others  such  as the  loan  scheme  for  tertiary  education  within
Singapore, compulsory medical savings account, including for the self-employed, and the
minimum  sum scheme designed to  provide regular monthly  inCDme  after  age 60  (Cable
1). The CPF  is thus not  simply a social security scheme,  but one which  is the  primary
socio-economic  -political planning and engineering tool for the policymakers.
Contribution  Rates
To  accommodate  such  ambitious  goals  reflected  in  a variety  of  schemes,  the
contribution  rates from the employers and employees  have been increased  significantly,
and  so  has the  maximum monthly contribution  (Appendix Table  2). Thus  the  nominal
contribution  rate of 10 percent at the inception of the CPF was raised in a series of steps
to  50  percent  by July 1984 (Appendix Table  2). As a measure to  combat  the  1985-86
recession, the rate was reduced to  35 percent. It was only in July 1994 that  the then  goal
8TABLE I
Various Schemes Under The CPF System
Type  Scheme  Year Introduced
Home  Approved Housing Scheme  1968
ownership  Approved Residential PropertyScheme  1981
Investment  Singapore Bus Services (1978) Ltd Share Scheme  1978
Approved Investment Scheme  1986a
Approved Non-Residential Properties Scheme (ANRPS)
CPF Investment Scheme (CPFIS)  1986
Share-Ownership Top-Up Scheme (SOTUS)  1997'
1993
Insurance  Home Protection Insurance Scheme  1982
Dependents' Protection insurance Scheme  1989
Medishield Scheme  1990
Others  Company Welfarism through Employers' Contribution
(COWEC) Schemec  1984
- Medisave  Scheme  1984'
Minimum Sum Scheme  1987
Topping-up of the Minimum Sum Scheme  1987
Financing of Tertiary Education in Singapore  1989
CPF Top-up Scheme  1995
a  From October, 1993, divided into the Basic and Enhanced investment schemes.
b  From January 1, 1997, CPFIS replaced the Approved Investment Scheme, thus eliminating
distinction between the Basic and Enhanced investment schemes.
c  From I 'st January 1999, there will be no more new contributions to the COWEC fund. The
scheme is therefore effectively discontinued.
d  From 1993,  self-employed persons must contribute to the Medisave scheme.
of a long term  rate of 40 percent, with equal contribution  rates from the  employers  and
the employees was realised.
The East Asian economic  cn'sis beginning with the devaluation  of the Thai Baht
in July 1997 has  however  necessitated  another  sharp  reduction  in the CPF  contribution
rate from 40 percent  to 30 percent from January 1, 1999. Initially the cut is for a period of
two  years. However,  any restoration  to  40 percent  rate would  be quite  gradual. This is
because  high  CPF  contribution  rates  are  regarded  by  the  policy  makers  as the  main
contributor  to Singapore's lack of cost competitiveness,  and because the recovery is likely
to  be more  gradual and  not  as broad-based  as the  one  which  occurred  after the  short-
lived 1985-86 recession.
9The contribution  rates are applicable  to a maximum  monthly  wage of $ 6,000 per
month,  which  is  2.4  times  the  average monthly  earnings (excluding employers'
contnbution to the CPF ) in 1998 of $ 2,549 (Republic  of Singapore,  Department of
Statistics,  1999,  p.9 ).  In 1997,  only 5.5 percent of the contributors earned above $6,000
per month as shown below in Table 3.
TABLE 3
Singapore: CPF Contribution By Monthly Wage Level, 1987 and 1997
Wage Level  1987  1997
Number  %  Number
All  935330  1224195
contributors  100.0  100.0
Below 1,000  574332  215587
1000  - 1999  61.4  17.7
2000 -4999  232486  443066
5000-  5999  24.8  36.2
6000 and  105388  455946
above  11.3  37.2






Source:  Republic of Singapore, Ministry of Manpower, Singapore Year Book of
Manpower Statistics, 1997, Table 2.2. p. l 8.
Finally,  Appendix Table 3  provides available  data for the 1983-97  period for the
following  characteristics  of the CPF  system. Unless otherwise noted, the data in the
following  discussion  is from Appendix  Table 3.
10Coverage
In  analysing  the  coverage  data,  a  distinction  between  membership  and
contributors  must  be kept  in mind. Any  individual who  has  in working life contributed
even once  becomes a member  and is regarded as such. In contrast,  contributors  refers to
active contributors  at  a given point  in time.  The contributors  to  labor force  ratio, after
reaching  a peak in 1984 at 72.3 percent  , has shown  a tendency  to decline to  slightly less
than  two-thirds by  1997. While this ratio is sensitive to the rate of unemployment,  during
the  1983-97  period,  the  unemployment  among  Singaporeans  was  minimal 3. Those
excluded,  about  one-third  of the  labor  force, are  foreign  workers,  self-employed,  and
some  low-paid  contract  workers.  As  even  the  foreign  professionals  have  been  fully
excluded since September  1998, the coverage ratio is expected to decline slightly.
As at  December  31,  1998, the  number  of employers  paying CPF  contributions
was 99,589, a slight decline from  103, 194 as at 31 March  1998 (CPF-PAL website).  The
self-employed  (defined  as those  who  are  not  employees)  numbered  242.4 thousand  in
1997, or  12.9 percent  of the  total  labor  force  (Republic of  Singapore, Department  of
Statistics, 1998, pp. 41 and 43). While it is compulsory  for the self-employed to contribute
to  the  Medisave  scheme,  this  is  not  the  case  for  the  CPF.  They  however  can  join
voluntarily and avail of tax deduction on the contributions.
The proportion  of the members who  are contributors  has been declining steadily
during the  1983-97 period,  from 51.5 percent  in 1983 to  44.0 percent  in 1997. The 1997
membership  of  2.782 million was nearly  90 percent  of the total  resident  population  in
1997.
In  1997, the  following  industries  accounted  for  the  bulk  of the  1.224 million
contributors to the CPF:  Commerce 297.1 thousand  (24.3 percent),  Manufacturing 275.1
thousand  (22.5 percent),  Financial and  Business services 225.5 thousand  (18.4 percent),
Other  services 218.4  thousand  (17.8 percent),  Construction  8.0 thousand  (6.6 percent)
and the rest 10.0 thousand  (0.1 percent).
IIMembers' Contributions  and Withdrawals
Contributions  of members as a percentage  of GDP, after reaching a peak of 15.4
percent in the recession  year of 1985, have shown a tendency to decline,  reaching 11.1
percent in 1997. A similar pattern is observed for the contributions to  Gross National
Savings (GNS) ratio. After reaching a peak of 36.2 percent in  1985, it subsequently
declined  to 21.1 percent in 1997.
The contributions to  the  CPF are divided into three  accounts. The ordinary
account (from January 1, 1999,  those under 55 years of age contribute between 22 and 24
percent of the applicable  wage  to this account depending  on age)  can be used for housing,
investments,  and other such schemes.
The second, the Medisave  account (from January 1, 1999,  those under 55 years of
age contribute between 6 and 8 percent of the applicable  wage depending upon age )
enables  the members to pay for permitted hospitalization  and outpatient costs, and to pay
premium for health insurance  scheme for major illnesses,  called  Medishield.  The premium
for Medishield  rises with age. Those above 75 years of age, who are most in need but
often cannot afford the medical  care, however are not covered.
Deductibles,  co-payment , yearly  and life time limits etc. mean that between one-
third  to two-thirds of the hospital bill (excluding  post-hospitalization  care) will still need
to  be paid by the individual member. As at December 31, 1998, Medishield schemes
severed about two million members and dependants, (CPF-PAL website), slightly less
than two-thirds of the population. Thus, one-third of the population does not even have
the basic catastrophic  health insurance.
During the October-December 1998 period, average  claim for Medishield  was $
618, while for Medishield Plus (a more expensive version), it was $ 1245 (CPF-PAL
website).  These relatively  low amounts per claim seem to point to the limited nature of
the health insurance  provision under the CPF.
12The third is the Special  Account  which is meant for retirement.  Before the
reduction  in contribution  rate  from  January  1, 1999,  4.0  percent  of the contributions  were
channelled  into this account.  However,  since the rate reduction,  no contributions  are
being  channelled  to this account.  If this continues,  retirement  provision  may  be adversely
affected.
Because  of the various schemes  of pre-retirement  withdrawals  enumerated  in
Table  1, and withdrawals  under  section  15  of the CPF act.  On reaching  55  years  of age,
death,  incapacitation,  and leaving  Singapore  and West Malaysia  permanently 4, the net
contributions  (contributions  less  withdrawals)  are  much  lower,  in some  years,  e.g.  in 1993
even  turning  negative.  The withdrawals  as percentage  of contributions  have  ranged  from
a low  of 38.3  percent  in 1983  to 105.0  in 1993.  In 1998,  withdrawals  were  85.1  percent  of
the contributions.  Thus, amount  available  to finance  retirement  is considerably  smaller
than  the high  contributions  may  suggest.
Most of the withdrawals  - in most years  more than half - are for housing,
reflecting  the importance  of the CPF for financing  housing  from  the demand  side 5. Under
the CPF Approved  Housing  scheme  (rable 1),  purchasers  are allowed  to withdraw  their
CPF  savings  to pay  the 20  percent  down  payment,  as  well  as to service  monthly  mortgage
instalments  for purchasing  government  constructed  housing.  (for  details  see Phang  and
Asher,  1997,  pp. 305-307).  Since  March  1986,  the mortgage  interest  rate  has been  pegged
at 0.1  percent  above  the CPF savings  rate.
Outright subsidies  for public housing have been kept to  a  minimum,  and
expenditure  on housing  has not comprised  more than 2 percent of total government
expenditure  in any fiscal  year.  Public  housing  prices  have  been  affordable,  mainly  because
the land  prices,  paid by the H1DB,  are well  below  what private  developers  pay for their
land.  Under  the Land  acquisition  Act, enacted  in 1966,  the government  and its agencies
are able  to acquire  land  for any  public,  residential,  commercial  or industrial  purposes,  at
pegged  prices,  which  are generally  below  the market  rates 6. Since  1981,  CPF balances
may  also  be used  to purchase  private  properties,  both for use and  as an investment.
13By 1990, the home ownership rate had increased to 88 percent and the share of
population living  in government constructed flats to 87 percent ; with the corresponding
proportions for 1970 being 29 percent and 36 percent respectively  (Phang,  1997).
In addition to housing,  health care and investment  schemes  are quite significant  in
terms of withdrawals. In  recent years, withdrawals from the Medisave Account have
constituted between 3 and 5 percent of total withdrawals.  The pre-retirement  investment
schemes are discussed  in the later part of the paper.
The withdrawals  under Section 15 of the CPF Act (i.e. for retirement etc.) have
fluctuated overtime , ranging  from a low of 10.8 percent of total withdrawals  in 1993  to a
high  of  33.8 percent  in  1983. More  importantly, the  average cash withdrawal at
withdrawal age continues to be quite low. Thus, during the October-December 1998
period, the  latest period for which data are available , 15469 members reaching the
withdrawal  age withdrew $ 301.8 million  under this provision, for a mean withdrawal  of
only $19,510 per person (CPF-PAL website). This is only 64 percent of the average
annual earnings of workers , not counting employer's CPF contributions. Clearly this
amount will  not be adequate  for old age.
It has been argued that the Minimum Sum scheme (Table 1), amounts invested
under  CPF's  investment schemes, and  potential for  converting housing equity into
retirement consumption (through reverse mortgage, or through implicit contract with
children, for  example) could result in  more adequate retirement provision than cash
balances alone may suggest.
While the above may be the case for a relatively  small proportion of the CPF
members,  the indications  are that there will be many who would still find themselves with
inadequate financial resources in old age. This is indicated by the fact that the median
balance for the active contributors as at end  1997 was between $ 50,000 and 60,000
(equivalent  to about 2 years of average wage) even when pre-retirement  withdrawals  for
housing, and property and other investments are included. The inactive members are
likely  to have even lower balances.
14Tax Treatment  of Pension Funds
In  Singapore, CPF  contributions for  citizens and  permanent residents are
exempted from the income tax . For tax year 1997, CPF deductions by the individual
income taxpayers  alone amounted to $ 3,617  milion or 2.5 percent of GDP in 1997.  The
value of the deduction to the CPF contributor depends on the marginal  income tax rate
for the individuals.  Those outside the individual  income tax net, about 75 percent of the
labor force in 1997,  do not get any benefits  from tax deductibility  of the CPF. For others,
the value  of the benefit from tax deductibility  rises  with the marginal  income  tax rate. The
tax  deductibility feature therefore  has  inherent  regressive imnpact.  The  employer's
contributions are also tax deductible.
In Singapore,  not only the contributions, but also accumulated  income, capital
gains from pre-retirement withdrawals,  including from stocks (except certain types of
property transactions ), and retirement withdrawals  are all exempt from taxation.  This is
more liberal  tax treatment than in other high income countries where at least one of the
three flows  is taxable 8.
However, gratuities,  annuities,  and pensions not related to the CPF or the public
sector are all taxed in Singapore  (Liin and Ooi, 1998).  For annuities,  preniums paid to
insurance  companies are not taxable,  while  the sums received  from the plans are taxable.
This has created a disincentive  for development  of alternative  pension plans, and for the
annuities  market (Lirn  and Ooi, 1998).
Singapore  provides extensive  set of tax incentives  (mainly  in the form of reduced
company income tax rates) for approved fund managers. The  1998-99 budget, for
example,  also provided for tax exemption  on disposal related  gains from unit trusts to the
fund management  companies.
15Members'  Balances
During the 1983-97  period, these balances  have increased steadily  from $19,504.7
million in 1983 to  $ 79,657.4 million  by 1997. In  relation to  GDP  however, these
balances, appear to  have  stabilised in  recent years around  55 percent  of  GDP,  a
significant  decline  from the peak of 75.9 percent of GDP achieved  in 1986.
Table 3 provides data concerning average  CPF balances per member in relation  to
average monthly earnings for the 1987-97  period. As indicated in the table, while the
average balance per member increased  from $ 15,458  in  1987 to $ 28,633 in 1997,  the
average balances to average earnings ratio has shown a significant  decline from 11.6 in
1987  to 9.6 in 1997.  Even at its peak, the average  balance  per member was equivalent  to
less than one years average  earnings.  While it would be more appropriate to estimate  the
balances  of the active  contributors to assess  the level of retirement financing,  the relevant
data are not published  by the CPF Board. However, as noted above, average  withdrawal
of  those  reaching the withdrawal age during October-December 1998 period were
equivalent to only 64 percent of the average annual earnings. Thus, in spite of rapid
economic growth and rising contribution rates, average balances of the CPF  member
remain  rather low.
16Table 3
Singapore:  Average  Balances Per  Member and Average Monthly  Earnings,  1987-97
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)= (4)/(3)
Average  Balance  Per
Year  Average  Montly  Average Monthly  Member/Average
Earnings  Earnings  (including  Monthly  Earnings
(excluding  Employer's  Employees  CPF  Average  Balance  Per  (including  employers
CPF Contributions)  Contribution)  Member  contribution)
1987  1176  1335  15458  11.6
1988  1273  1426  15790  11.1
1989  1398  1608  16313  10.1
1990  1528  1773  18504  10.4
1991  1669  1969  20421  10.3
1992  1804  2129  22191  10.4
1993  1918  2282  21361  94
1994  2086  2503  23059  9.2
1995  2219  2663  24640  9.3
1996  2347  2816  29503  10.5
1997  2480  2976  28633  9,6
Notes
Inclusive  all  remuneration  received  before  deduction  of  the employee's  CPF  contributions  and  individual  income  tax.  They  include
basic  wage,  overtime  payments.  commissions,  allowances  and  other  nonetary  payments,  annual  wage  supplement,  and  variable  bonus.
Column  (3) is  calculated  as  amount  in colunm  (2)  + Employer's  CPF  contribution  (Amount  in oolumn  (2)).  This  is only  approximation  due  to  the
wage  ceiling  for employees  contribution.
Source:
Average  montly  Earnigns  From  Republic  of Singapore,  Ministry  of Manpower,  Sin_tapore  Year  Book  of Manpower  Staistics 1997
Table  2.2, p. 18.  Average  Balance  per  Member  from  data  in Tables  1  and  5 of  this  paper.
It is by now accepted even by the policy makers that the CPF  balances alone will
be inadequate to  finance retirement.  In  a recent  survey, even those  Singaporeans with
CPF accounts,  only 44 percent  indicated that  the  CPF  would  be sufficient for  old age
support  (Chan, 1998, Table 5, p.28).  The survey found  that the  females were especially
likely to find the CPF scheme as inadequate for financing retirement, with vast majority
relying on their children  for financial support.  (Chan, 1998).  Both the demographic and
attitudinal changes are likely to reduce the potential for relying on children to finance old
age.
17Investment of CPF Balances
Three separate pools of investible  funds exist  under Singapore's  CPF system.  The
first and the largest  is the members'  balances  with the CPF Board.  As at 31 December
1998,  members  balances  amounted  to $ 85,276.8  million  (CPF-PAL  website).  According
to the CPF Act, these funds must be invested  in government  bonds (and in advanced
deposit with  the  Monetary  Authority of  Singapore,  MAS, to  be  converted into
government  bonds  at a later  date).  The bonds  are floating  rate bonds  issued  specifically  to
the CPF Board  to meet interest  and other obligations.  They  do not have quoted  market
values.
The floating  rate is exactly  identical  to the interest  rate  which  is paid  by the CPF
Board  to its members.  Since  1986,  the interest  rate  paid  by the CPF Board  on members'
balances  is a simple  average  of the 12-month  deposit  and month-end  savings  rate  of the
four major local banks, subject  to a mrinimum  nominal rate of 2.5 percent as spelled  out in
the CPF Act. The interest is computed monthly and compounded and credited annually
by the CPF Board. Interest paid on balances  in the special  account  is 1.5 percentage
points higher than the rate paid on balances  in the Ordinary  Account.  Currently,  the
interest  rate on fixed  deposits  and on savings  deposits  are weighted  equally.  However,
from July 1, 1999, the  fixed deposit weightage  will increase to  80 percent, with
corresponding  decline  to 20 percent  for the savings  deposits.  This administrative  change
can be expected  to lead  to higher  rates  to members  as fixed  deposits  have  normally  higher
rates  than  the savings  deposits.
This administrative  arrangements  for paying  short-term  interest  rates for long-
term funds, and further  restricting  the rate to what four relatively  insulated  local  banks
pay  on local  currency  deposits  is rather  curious.  This arrangement,  however  clearly  shows
the administered  rather than the market  determined  nature  of the interest  rate paid  on
CPF balances.  This arrangement  also further obfuscates  the investment  perrformance
arising  from  the ultimate  deployment  of the members'  balances,  as explained  below.
18It is therefore not surprising that during the 1987-1997  period, the real annual
compound interest rate credited  to the CPF member's accounts (defined  as the difference
between the nominal rate less inflation as measured by the GDP deflator) was roughly
zero percent. Indeed, in 5 out of 11 years during the above period, the real interest rate
was negative.
The Singapore government has been running rather large budgetary surpluses
over many years. Yet, it has a large internal  public debt amounting to $ 102,371.9  million
as at end-1997, equivalent  to 71.6 percent of GDP in 1997.  Thus, large budget surpluses
and large public debt co-exist in Singapore.  Since much of the debt is non-marketable,
there is little activity  in the secondary  market for government  bonds.
Given the large budget surpluses  of the Singapore  government over considerable
period (Asher, 1999), the CPF funds have not been needed to  finance infrastructure or
other  governnent  expenditure.  The  widespread belief that  the  CPF  has  financed
infrastructure and  actual construction of  public housing (as opposed  to  facilitating
housing mortgage for members) (see  endnote 5) is thus not supported by macroeconomic
analysis. How are the CPF balances  then ultimately  deployed?  Essentially,  the Singapore
Government (through Singapore  Government Investment Corporation, SGIF, and other
government-controlled holding  companies  such  as  Temasek  Holdings,  and  other
agencies)  invests these funds. There is, however, no transparency  or public accountability
concerning  where these funds are invested, and what has been the investment  criteria and
performance.  These funds, however,  are believed  to be predominantly  invested abroad.
Such transparency and public accountability are of particular relevance as the
economic  and financial  crisis  in much of Southeast  and Northeast Asia negatively  impacts
on growth prospects and asset values. In recent years, Singapore  has consciously  directed
greater  proportion  of  its  resources  (presumably including the  CPF  funds)  into
investments in East Asia. Yet, no information has been provided on the performance of
these investments.
19Investment of pension funds abroad is usually recommended as a way to attain
diversification  of country and other risks. However, the investment arrangements in
Singapore  do not permit an assessment of the extent to which such diversification  has
occurred, or its results.
A statement in the Parliament  in March 1996 by the Finance Minister  indicating
that investment returns on Singapore's reserves have averaged over 5.0 percent (no
precise  figure  was given)  in Singapore  dollar  terms over the last 10  years could be used to
estimate the implicit  tax borne by the CPF members on their balances. Subtracting  the
nomninal  rate of 3.5 percent  in 1997 from the  5.0 percent  provides the  difference of 1.5
percent. Multiplying it by the  average balances of members  that year  (calculated as the
beginning  balance plus one  half of the  addition to  the  balances between  the beginning
and the  end  of  1997) of $ 69.3 billion, gives the  implicit tax  on  members  of $  1039.5
million, equivalent to 6.5 percent of the contributions in 1997. It is important to recognise
that so long as the nomninal  rate paid to members is less than what the government  earns
on members balances, the implicit tax is paid by members each year, though  the amount
vanes. Moreover, as lower income individuals have disproportionate  share of their wealth
in the  CPF,  such implicit tax  imposes relatively heavier burden  on  them.  The  above
vividly illustrates how political risks and non-transparency  could arise even when there are
individualised accounts.
The  second  pool  of  investible  funds  consists  of  insurance  funds  which  are
relatively small, amounting to  only $  1500 million in  1997. These are invested  in  fixed
deposits,  negotiable  certificates of  deposit,  equities, and  bonds.  Out-sourcing  of these
funds for  investment  is believed to  be much  greater.  Thus  the  asset allocation for  the
insurance funds is much  more  diversified as compared  to  CPF  balances. It  is therefore
not surprising that the  rate of return  on insurance funds is somewhat higher than  on the
CPF balances (Appendix Table 3).  However, because of their negligible  weight in the
total investible balances, the impact on the interest credited to members is also negligible.
The  third  pool  of  investible  funds  consists  of  pre-retirement  withdrawal  by
members under  the  CPF  investment  schemes. Investment  of CPF  savings by  members
20started in May 1996 under  the Approved  Investment  Scheme (AIS). The primary aim was
to enable CPF members  , if they wished to invest part  of their CPF  savings in approved
instruments  so as to  enhance  assets for  old age. Over  the years, the  investment  scheme
has evolved to provide  CPF members with more  options  to invest their CPF savings. In
October  1993, the  AIS was  liberalised into  a  2-tier  scheme-  the  Basic and  Enhanced
Investment  Schemes (BIS and EIS). These schemes were subsequently  merged in January
1997 to form the CPF Investment  Scheme (CPFIS).
Since its  introduction,  there  has  been  considerable  liberalisation  of investment
rules and guidelines governing the CPFIS.  The CPFIS permits  individuals to invest in the
stock markets  either  directly by purchasing  CPF  approved  stock,  or indirectly through
mutual funds  (called unit-trusts).  Members  can also invest in endowment  policies, gold,
Singapore  government  bonds,  bank  deposits,  and  fund  management  accounts.  Apart
from trustee  stocks, CPF  members can also invest in nine  loan stocks listed on  the main
board.  As at end-June  1997, 411,235 CPF  members  (56.4 percent  of those eligible, but
less than  a  sixth  of total  members)  had  withdrawn  $  10.82 billion, 44  percent  of the
potential  amount  of $ 24.6 billion eligible for  investment.  Thus,  amount  withdrawn  for
investment per  participating member  ($ 10.82 billion divided by 411,235) amounted  to $
26,311.  By May  1998, the  amount  withdrawn  had  risen to  $12.1 billion, of which  only
$400 million (3.3 percent of the total) had been invested through  22 CPF  approved unit-
trusts  out of a total of about  120.  Thus, individuals have chosen  to  primarily invest on
their own.  A  substantial part  of the  investible  fund  have  gone  into purchase  of partial
divestment of state telecom monopoly,  Singapore Telecom. Indeed  , the government  had
provided  discounts  and  outright  subsidies  to  encourage  CPF  members  to  buy  the
Singapore Telecom  shares in 1993 and  1996.
Net  realised profits  or loss  (gross realised profit  plus dividends  and  interest less
bank charges and related costs and CPF  accrued interest on the entire investment amount
withdrawn)  are  computed  on  September  30  each year  and  credited.  In addition  to  1
percent  of  value  of  stocks  charged  by  stock  brokers  on  purchase  and  sale of  shares,
approved  banks also have a fixed dollar charge (subject to a maximum) per transaction of
different  types.  In addition,  approved  banks  also levy a service or administrative charge.
21The fixed  nature  of the fees  implies  a larger  proportionate  burden  on those  with relatively
small  amount  of investments.
From  January  1, 1998,  CPF-approved  unit-trusts  were  allowed  to invest  as much
as 50 percent  of their funds  in the following  overseas  markets:  Malaysia,  Thailand,  Hong
Kong,  Taiwan,  and  South  Korea, U.S.,  U.K.,  and  Japan.
In May  1998,  the Singapore  authorities  announced  significant  relaxation  of rules
governing  CPF approved  unit-trusts.  The changes  cover  a more  transparent  way  to select
CPF-approved  fund managers  and the unit-trusts  they offer;  substantial  liberalisation  of
permitted  investment  by the unit-trusts;  and greatly  enhanced  disclosure  requirements.
Criteria  for approving  the unit trusts  have  also  been  substantiaLy  liberalised.
For the approved  unit-trusts,  the 40 percent  limnit  on investment  in non-trustee
stocks,  50  percent  limit  on foreign-currency  denominated  investment,  and specification  of
countnes in which investments  can be made,  have all been removed. Only certain
prudential  norms  remain.  The unit trust management  are  to be encouraged  to publicly
declare  the benchmark  against  which their performance  is to be measured.  The CPF
Board  has classified  various  approved  unit trust in terms  of their  asset  diversification  and
risk levels. Their performance  will be regularly  published;  and extensive  educational
campaign  to enable  CPF members  to invest  prudently  has  been  launched.
The authorities  hope that the removal  of the previous  curbs  on asset  allocation
would  improve  investment  performance,  and  encourage  CPF  members  to primarily  invest
through the unit trusts. The above measures  are also designed  to  encourage  fund
management  industry,  an area in  which Singapore  aims to  develop a competitive
advantage.
Requiring  Singapore  companies  to  move towards internationally  compatible
corporate  disclosure  rules  and modes of governance  could  assist  in making  better asset
allocation  decisions.  Some steps have been taken in this direction by the Singapore
authorities,  but there  is still  considerable  room  for improvement.
22It is strongly suggested that there  is considerable merit in considering the proposal
for harmonising  disclosure requirements for ukimate investment (not just the purchase of
government  securities as currently reported) of the members' balances with the CPF with
those recently announced for the CPF approved unit-trusts.
The  changes  announced  for  the  unit-  trusts  do  not  provide  for  performance
standard,  or  for  regulation  of  the  cornmission,  administrative,  and  other  charges, the
spread between bid and offer prices and the like.  As the average investment per  member
is likely to  be relatively small, transaction  costs of operating through  unit-trusts  are likely
to be of some  significance.  This  area deserves much  more  attention  of the researchers
and the policymakers than has been the case so far.
It is however  interesting to  observe that in sharp contrast  to the CPF, the "Saver
scheme" for the Armed forces has opted for the centralisation of the investment  function
with professional  fund managers selected directly by the Board. In contrast , the CPF has
entrusted  the  choice  of  selecting  unit-trusts  and  asset  allocation  decisions  to  the
individuals.  This  potentially  sets  up  two  contrasting  mechanisms  or  pension  fund
investments  which  overtime  may  provide  information  on  their  effectiveness  in
minimising transaction  costs , and maximising returns credited to the  members. It would
be useful to  consider harmonising the disclosure requirements of the  SAVER Fund with
those recently announced for the CPF approved unit-trusts.
The  expectation  that  permitting  individual CPF  members  to  make  their  own
investments  would permit  higher returns was not fully realised even  before the  current
currency  and  stock market  crisis in  Southeast  Asia. Thus,  during  each year during  the
1994-1997 period,  less than  20 percent  of participating members  realised returns above
what they  would  have made had  they left the  money  with the  CPF, while in  1998, the
corresponding  proportion  was  only  10.0 percent.  In  the  aggregate,  losses  of  those
investing exceeded  gains.  Thus, for the October  1, 1995 to September  30, 1996 period,
20.7 percent  of those  investing made  an aggregate profit  of $179.7 million, while 79.3
percent  of  the  members  made  losses  totaling  $198.7  rnillion  (The  Straits  Times,
23Singapore, April 9, 1997).  During the period October 1996 to  September 1997, 11.7
percent of 434,802 members investing made a profit of  S$111.4 million, while 88.3
percent made losses  of $338  million (Business  Times,  Singapore,  January 20, 1998).
The effects of  the  May  1998 liberalisation, measures, including removal of
specification  of countries where investments can be made by the unit trusts (but not CPF
members on their own), are yet to be reflected  in the data.
As the data on the composition of investments,  and on unrealised capital gains is
not been made available  by the CPF Board, it is difficult  to make a fuller analysis  of this
issue at this time. It  is to  be  hoped that along with the liberalisation of the CPFIS
sketched earlier, there will also be greater recognition  on the part of the CPF Board to
regard such information  as a public good, and thereby facilitate  fuller analysis  of the issue
and enhance transparency.
24III.  THE  REFORM  OPTIONS
The main characteristics of Singapore's Pension  system emerging from the analysis in
the previous sections may be sumrnan'sed as follows:
1)  Single Dominant  Pillar:  Singapore has almost solely relied on the State mandated,
and managed  savings pillar for  its formal  pension  system. It  has also attempted  to
encourage informal  family and comnnunity arrangements  for financing old age. This
strategy has recently been reaffirmed by the government  in its terms of reference for
the Inter Ministerial Committee on Ageing Population which is to examine all aspects
relating  to  the  issues  arising  from  the  rapid  ageing  of  Singapore's  population,
including financing issues. The Committee  is tO  present  a  report  for  discussion  by
September 1999.
2)  Multiple  Objectives  :The CPF is more than  a pension  scheme. It also incorporates
housing,  health  care  financing,  and  tertiary  education.  To  accommodate  these
schemes, which  have evolved gradually over time, the contribution  rates have had to
be increased significantly, reaching 50 percent of the wages at one point.  In addition,
various  investment  and  other  scheme  has  enabled  the  governnent  to  direct  a
significant proportion  of the disposable income of nearly two-thirds of the labor force
towards  government  determined  socio-political  and  economic  objectives.  The
operations  of  the  CPF  in  conjunction  with  the  excellent  information  technology
infrastructure  and  skills have  provided  the  policy makers  with  perhaps  unparallel
databank concerning the socio-economic profile of the population.
3)  Low Replacement  Rate and  Limited  Coverage  of Risks:
High  contribution  rates and  rapid economic  and  wage growth  notwithstanding, the
average balances of the CPF members remain relatively low. The CPF Board does not
publish the replacement rates or the actuarial status of the CPF  . In its 1987 Annual
report, the CPF  Board had indicated that  the replacement  rate for the CPF  members
would be between 20 and 40 percent. The report,  however did not indicate how these
25figures could be  obtained, and there  has been no  further discussion of  the
replacement  rates  in the subsequent  annual  reports.
Simulation  studies  by  the actuarial  firm  Watson  Wyatt  Worldwide  in 1996  have  shown
that assuming  the typical  use of the CPF,  low,  middle  and high earner  single  individuals
would  need  to contribute  additional  18.7  percent,  32.6  percent  and 46.6  percent  of their
monthly  income  to meet the benchmark  replacement  rate equal to two-thirds  of final
income. Given the  high CPF  contribution rates, additional contributions  of  this
magnitude  are  not realistic.
A recent  unpublished  simulation  study  by Leong  and Das-Gupta  does conclude
that '... the CPF , by and large , does not adequately  provide  for old -age security'
(1998,p.10).
The reasons  for low CPF balances  and the replacement  rate lie primarily  on
extensive  pre-retirement  withdrawals  , particularly  for housing,  and on extremely  low  real
rates of return credited  to members'  accounts. As noted in the previous  section,  the
implicit  tax on the CPF balances  is recurrent  and quite high.  It does appear  that the
routine housekeeping  functions  such as collecting  contributions,  administering  various
schemes,  record  keeping,  administering  retirement  benefits,  etc.  are being  undertaken  by
the CPF Board at fairly  low costs. Thus, in 1997,  the administrative  costs of the CPF
Board  to total contribution  ratio  was  0.62;  while  the administrative  costs  to total balances
ratio  was 0.12.  Moreover,  the administrative  costs  have fluctuated  within  a fairly  narrow
range.  Thus, the normal  housekeeping  costs of the CPF Board  have  not contributed  to
either  the low  balances  or the low  rates  of return  credited  to members.
The above  costs,  however  relate  only  to those  of the CPF Board  itself,  and  do not
cover  the costs  borne  by the individuals  under  the CPFIS.  While  no data are available  on
the transactions  costs  (including  the administrative  costs)  relating  to the CPFIS,  these  are
likely  to be substantial,  given  low average  amount  invested  under the CPFIS,  the fixed
nature  of many  of the fees  levied  by  the banks  and  unit trusts,  and  the lack  of competition
26in the funds management industry. As noted, it would be desirable to require the fund
managers  to publish rates of return net of fees and charges  on their portfolio.
The CPF does not  cover inflation and longevity risks 9,  and does not  provide
survivor's benefits. Also, because  it is a defined contribution (DC) scheme, it does not
have any formal mechanism  for sharing in nations' economic  growth. Thus, the retirees
may find their relative  position in the income distribution  burgeoning  over time, thereby
accentuating  pre-retirement  inequalities.
The above characteristics  of the pension system in Singapore  suggest that while
the system has many strengths, particularly  the emphasis  on defined contributions (DC)
and fully  funded (FF) nature, it also has severe shortcomings. The reform options thus
need to address  the limitations  while  maintaining  the strengths  of the present system.
It is widely accepted even by the policy makers that the CPF by itself will be
inadequate  to finance old age.  Even as policy  makers acknowledge  this, they are reluctant
to consider a shift towards a multi-pillar  social security  system. This would require the
strengthening  of the tax financed first pillar.  This could be accomplished  through several
measures.  These include liberalisation  of public assistance  rules, and substantial  increases
in the benefits  provided.
Another  option would be  to  make up  the difference between the  annuity
available  from members own balances  and the annuity (inflation  indexed and one which
covers longevity risks )  needed for appropriately defined replacement rate from  the
government budget. Appropnrate  criteria and prudential rules may be set to  minimise
abuse.
It would also be useful to reconsider  the predorminance  of housing finance in the
CPF scheme. This would require  reconsideration  of the predorrminant  role of the HDB
and other governmental agencies in the housing and real estate market in  Singapore.
Greater use of market forces in the housing market intended by the governrnent  would
also require changes  in the CPFs' housing schemes.
27There is a strong  case  for giving  retirement  objective  greater  prominence  in the
CPF scheme.  If the importance  of housing  finance  cannot  be reduced,  then it would  be
difficult  to bring  about the requisite  shift as health  care needs,  the other major user of
CPF  balances  , are  expected  to increase  significantly.
The recent  reforms  of the CPFIS  have generally  been in the right direction  in
terrns  of diversification  of investment  portfolio  and asset  allocation  rules.  The investment
choices  under the CPFIS  are made  by the individuals  according  to their risk  preferences
and investor  sophistication.  As noted,  the transactions  costs  involved  in such choice  are
likely  to  be high.  The CPF Board,  therefore may consider  the approach  used by the
"Saver  Scheme"  of the Armed  Forces  under  which  investment  allocation  among  different
funds managers  and asset classes  is undertaken  at the central  level,  thereby  minimising
transactions  costs and ensuring  capability  of availing  of expert  advice  and monitoring  of
funds managers.  This would also  permit the CPF Board to move away  from investing
only  in government  bonds  at administratively  determined  interest  rates.
The CPFIS could be continued,  while providing a  choice to  members of
investment portfolios encompassing  different risk -return  profiles selected in  a
centralised  manner.  Another  important  measure  to enhance  the rate of return credited
to members  would  be to eliminate  the implicit  tax being  levied  at the present  time.  This
would  require  that the CPF Board  follow  the same  disclosure  rules  that are required  by
the unit trusts under  the CPFIS  and that the Board  credit  all the returns  earned  on the
investments  of CPF balances.  In addition  to improving  efficiency  and equity,  this would
also  substantially  increase  the transparency  of the pension  system,  and reduce  the political
risks  associated  with  it.
The Singapore  experience  demonstrates  both the strengths  and the limitations  of
the State mandated and managed  DC/FF  system of financing  old age. Singapore's
financial  and human  resources  and capabilities,  as well  as its proven  record  in responding
to material  needs  of its population,  suggests  that the reform  options  discussed  above  are
well  within  its capacity  to implement.
28IV.  ENDNOTES
1.  This has two significant implications for social security arrangements in
Singapore. First, the presence of Foreign workers in such a large number
has enhanced the economic and tax base available to finance social security
needs of  the resident workers. Second, it reflects  very open nature of
Singapore's  economy. This, however severely constrains social security
options available to Singapore . This is because a highly open economy is
very much dependent on capital and professional manpower, both of which
exhibit considerable factor elasticity, requiring tax burden on them to be
kept low. Individual therefore is required to bear a major part of financing
his social security needs.
2.  Under  the  public  assistance  scheme,  families  are  provided monthly
assistance ranging from $ 200 for I adult person household to a maximum
of $  570 for a 4 person household consisting of  I adult and 3 children
(Republic of Singapore, Ministry of Community Development, 1998, p.5).
The amount for one person household is equivalent to only 6.1 percent of
the 1997 per capita GDP of $ 39, 310 (Singapore, Department of Statistics,
1998, P.2). The stringency of  the eligibility for even the above meager
public assistance is indicated by the small number receiving it. Thus, in
January 1999, only 2,086 individuals were receiving such assistance, of
which,  1,701 were aged destitutes (Singapore, Department of Statistics,
February 1999,  p.91).
3.  Except for  1987, when the unemployment rate was 4.0 percent, it  has
hovered around 2.0 percent of the  labor force (Republic of  Singapore,
Department of Statistics, 1998, p.41).
4,  Under the CPF rule, those Malaysians who have contributed  to the CPF and
are returning to West Malaysia are not permitted to withdraw their CPF
balances until age 55, same as  for other members. However, Malaysians
from East Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak can withdraw when they
leave Singapore. This, plus the crisis-induced need for the funds by the
Malaysian government, and the refusal of the CPF authorities to release
even any data  on the  Malaysian workers and  their CPF  balances, has
resulted an irritant in the bilateral diplomatic relations between the two
countries.
5.  It should be emphasized that the CPF  balances are not used to finance
actual construction of public housing. To enable the government's Housing
and Development Board (HDB) to construct public housing and to provide
mortgage loans,  the  government from  its  budgetary sources has  been
providing loans at subsidised rates. As at March  1, 1998, according to
Singapore's budget documents , total outstanding loans to the HDB from
the government budget amounted to  $ 55,070 million. As the HDB has
been repaying loans over the years, gross budgetary support to the HDB is
even higher.
296.  From 1974, the pegged price was the market values from the 30 November,
1973 until 12 January, 1988, when it was changed to the market value on I
January , 1986. If the market value , at the date of acquisition , is lower
than the pegged price,  then the market value is used , for the purposes of
compensation, instead (  Phang,  1997). The government currently  owns
more than 85 percent of total land in Singapore. It has recently announced
its intention to move closer to paying market prices for any additional land
acquired.
7.  It should be noted that public housing ownership rights in  Singapore are
incomplete or truncated as the land on which the flats are constructed is
leased from the state rather than owned. The lease  period is usually 99
years.  As  the public  housing program  is  only  three  decades old, it  is
expected that  as  the  remaining lease period becomes  shorter,  loans to
purchase such older housing and value of such housing would decline. The
government  nevertheless  embarked  in  1989  on  a  multi-billion  dollar
program to upgrade the public housing estates, with the households paying
between 10 and 3  5 percent of the upgrading costs (Phang, 1997). Given the
truncated ownership rights, the reverse mortgage method of using housing
equity to finance retirement consumption would be even less effective than
is normally the case. Indeed, the reverse mortgage transactions so far have
been fairly small (less than 200), and have not involved public housing.
8.  For international comparison of tax treatment of funded pension schemes,
see Whitehouse (1999).
9.  Under the Minimum sum scheme, there is an option to purchase an annuity
from  an  approved  insurance company  which  will  guarantee a  regular
monthly nominal income for life in return for a lump sum premium , but
this option is not popular with the retirees as the cash component of the
minimum sum scheme is quite small (in 1998, the cash component was
only $16,000) and many retirees do not even have this amount. In any case,
there are no inflation indexed annuities on the market.
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1.  SOUTHEAST  ASIA:  SELECTED  DEMOGRAPHIC  AND  LABOUR  FORCE  INDICATORS
Average  Annual  Average  Annual  Total  Proportion  of  Elderly
Rate  of Population  Rate  of Labour  Fertility  Population  Dependency
Growth  Force  Growth  Rate  (TFR)  above  0a  Ratio  (EDR)
Country
1990-  2000-30  2030-50  1990-2000 2000-30 2030-50 1990-95 2025-30  1990  2030  1990  2025
_____  ____  2000  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Indonesia  1.5  1.0  0.5  2.4  1.1  0.2  2.93  2.16  6.4  14.1  11.3  19.3
Malaysia  2.1  1.3  0.7  2.6  1.6  0.5  3.50  2.08  5.7  14.5  10.3  20.8
Philippines  2.3  1.5  0.8  2.7  2.0  0.7  4.05  2.11  5.3  13.5  8.9  16.2
Singapore  1.6  0.8  0.0  1.5  0.3  -0.1  1.80  2.05  8.5  29.4  12.6  43.9
Thailand  1.4  0.8  0.4  1.4  0.8  0.1  2.21  211  6.0  18.0  10.0  23.1
Sources:  Heller, P.S., 1997. "Ageing  Asian 'Tigers': Challenges  for Fiscal Policy'
Processed,  Table 1. Heller's estimating are based on unspecified  World Bank
Statistical  Source. World Bank,  Averting Old Age Crisis, New York: Oxford
University Press, 1994 Tables Al  and A2, pp. 343-353; and Bos, et al., World
Population  Projection '1994-95,  Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins UniversitY,
Press,  Table  10,  pp.  30-33.
Notes:
a  TFR is the average number of births per woman in the population.  A TFR of 2.1 maintains  a
stable population,  assuming no net migration  takes place. TFR of slightly above  2 is needed  to
account for women who may die before reaching  the fertility age.
b  EDR is defined as persons 60 years and above/persons 15-59.
31TABLE 2
CPF Contribution Rates
Nominal Contribution Rates (%)a  Effective Contribution  Maximum monthly
Effective Date  Rates (%)b  Contribution
Employer  Employee  Total  Total  (S$)
July 1955  5.0  5.0  10.0  9.5  50
September 1968  6.5  6.5  13.0  12.2  300
January 1970  8.0  8.0  16.0  14.8  300
January 1971  10.0  10.0  20.0  18.2  300
January 1972  14.0  10.0  24.0  21.1  360
January 1973  15.0  11.0  26.0  22.6  390
January 1974  15.0  15.0  30.0  26.1  450
January 1975  15.0  15.0  30.0  26.1  600
January 1977  15.5  15.5  31.0  26.8  620
January 1978  16.5  16.5  33.0  28.2  990
January 1979  20.5  16.5  37.0  31.0  1,110
January 1980  20.5  18.0  38.5  32.0  1,155
January 1981  20.5  22.0  42.5  35.3  1,275
January 1982  22.0  23.0  45.0  36.9  1,350
January 1983  23.0  23.0  46.0  37.4  1,380
November 1983  23.0  23.0  46.0  37.4  1,840
July 1984  25.0  25.0  50.0  40.0  2,500
July 1985  25.0  25.0  50.0  40.0  3,000
April 1986  10.0  25.0  35.0  31.8  2,100
July 1988  12.0  24.0  36.0  32.1  2,160
July 1989  15.0  23.0  38.0  33.0  2,280
July 1990  16.5  23.0  39.5  33.9  2,535
July 1991  17.5  22.5  40.0  34.0  2,400
July 1992  18.0  22.0  40.0  33.9  2,400
July 1993  18.5  21.5  40.0  33.8  2.400
July 1994  20.0  20.0  40.0  33.3  2,400
January 1999  10.0  20.0  30.0  27.3  N.A
N.A:  Not Available
NOTES:
a  :  The contribution  rates apply  to monthly  wages  exceeding  $363 per month.  For those  earning  below  this
level,  the rates  are lower.  Since  July 1988,  the rates  have  also  been  lower  for those  above  55 years  of age.
The  pensionable  employees  in the public  sector  also  contribute  at  a lower  rate.
b  :  Contributions  as  a share  of total  gross  wage  including  employers  CPF  contribution  (i.e.:
ri +  r
renefie  =  1 + r.
where  r,  =  nominal  employee  rate
re  =  nominal employer rate
c  :  The maximum  amount  in this  column  applies  to those  below  55 years  of  age. The  maximum  contribution  is
lower  for those above  55 years of age.  Moreover,  the maximum  applies  only to ordinary  wages.  For
additional  wages,  such as bonuses,  statutory  contribution  rates apply without  limits  Thus actual CPF
contribution  may  exceed  the  maximum  specified  in the  column.
d.  :  The  cut is initially  planned  for two years.  For those  between  ages  55 and 60,  the  contribution  rate  is 16.5
percent (4 percent by the employer and 12.5 percent by the employee);  For those between 60 and 65
years of  age, the  contribution rate  is 9.5  percent (2  percent by the  employer and  7.5 percent by the
employee); For those above 65 years of age, the contribution rate is 7 percent ( 2 percent by employer and
5 percent by the employee).
Source:  Central Provident Fund, Annual Report, various years; The Straits Times (Singapore), November, 25, 1998.
32TABLE 3
SELECTED INDICATORS OF SINGAPORE'S CENTRAL PROVIDENT FUND, 1983-1997 (All amounts in million $S)
1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997
Coverage
Members  (thousands)  1778.9  1852.5  1891.7  1933.8  1988.5  2063.4  2126.9  2195.2  2255 7  2322.8  2456.4  2521.8  2683.0  2741.8  2782.0
Contributors  (thousands)  917.9  943.0  889.6  912.0  935.3  963.8  988.6  1021.7  1052.4  1074.0  1107.1  1138.9  1174.8  11939  1224.2
Contributors/Labour  Force (%)  70.9  72.3  691  70 2  70 4  69.9  69.4  65.4  67.7  66.3  67.7  67.3  67.2  66 3  65 3
Contributors/Members  (%)  51.5  50.9  470o  47.2  470  46.7  46.5  46.5  46.7  46.2  45.1  45.2  43.8  43.5  44.0
Excess of Contributions
Over Withdrawals  (During  2772.6  1874.5  2633.5  935.5  149,3  974.6  2444.0  3170.7  3436.5  3609.9  (522.2)  3987.0  6283.4  4093.4  4398.3
Period)
4491 0  53852  5393.4  4777.8  4446.8  4985.1  6107.5  7174.2  8101.4  9208.2  10427.0  11279.0  13536.1  14623.0  15873.8
Member's  Contributions  16306 1  18596.4  16543  4  15588,5  16304  8  20224  0  25381.1  29930.0  34497.5  39370.4  42363.2  52625.5  60720.1  66455.5  75144.7
Gross National  Savings  (GNS)  27 5  29.0  36 2  30 6  27 3  24,6  24.1  24.0  23 5  234  24.6  21.4  22.3  22.0  21.1
Contributions  as % of GNS
12.2  134  15.4  12.4  10.4  100  10.9  10.6  10.8  11.4  11.1  10.4  11.2  11.0  11.1
Contributions  as % GDP
1718.4  3510.7  3359 9  2824.3  4297,5  4010  5  3663 5  40035  4664.9  5418.3  10949.2  7292.0  7252.7  10,529.6  11475.5
vvithdrawals: Amount  38.3  65.2  62.3  59.1  96.6  80.4  59 9  55 8  57.6  58.8  105.0  64.6  53.6  72.0  72.3
As % of contributions
76.7  76.4  692  61.6  69.2  65.9  56.4  64.3  66.7  32.1  48,0  64.1  48,0  50.1
% of total withdrawals  for  65,3  21.2  20.9  22,9  174  19.6  22.9  25,5  20,5  18.7  10.8  18.7  20.0  15.5  13.5
Apr gSchemesa  33 8  0.5  1.3  2.7  3.3  4,2  4.9  5 9  5,7  51  2 7  3.8  5 0  3.7  3.7 Approved Housing  Sn.a  1.6  1 5  5.1  17.7  7.0  6.3  12.1  9.4  9.5  54 .4e  30.0  10.9  3 2.8e  32.4e Under Section 15b  0,9
Medical Schemesc  22670.4  26834 1  29341.4  30607.8  32529.3  36051.6  40646.4  46049.0  51526.9  52334.3  57649  0  66035.4  72566  6  79657.4 Othersd  ~~~~19504.7  56.6  68.9  75.9  71 7  65.5  64  1  59,9  61.1  63.6  53.3  54.7  575. Othersd  ~~~~ ~  ~  ~  ~  ~~53A  1555.7  5
Members  Balances  (End Period)  25031.5  28077.3  32164.4  33793.1  38274.3  41830.7  46209.7  51425.6  59041.1  67252.5  698822.0  753444  86507.6  94474.8  102371.9
As °/%  of GDP  25°68.1  28°70.1  82.6  87.4  89.7  84.2  82,2  7558  78.4  83.0  741  69.6  717  71.72  716
Asubc  GDebt  6.1  6.2  5.5  3.7  3.0  3.1  3.7  4.5  38  2.6  2.4  34  3.5  3.5
Rate of Return to Members  1.2  26  05  (1°4)  0.5  1.5  264  34  374  2.3  2.4  3.1  187  1.4  2.0
Imliitinerstrae  39  0.7  (1.2)  (1.4)  1.2  6.2  4.8  4.9  3.7  1.0  5  3 8  2.6  1.4  1.4 Implicitiinterest  rate  )  2.2  54  74  6.9  2.5  (32)  (1 7)  (1.2)  0.8  2.8  (2.9)  (1.4)  0.8  21  2.1
Inflation  Rate  (% change)  2.2
Consumer Price Index
GDPDeflator  N.A  47  6.4  5.1  6.2  76  41  6.6  5.1  94  3.6  38  43  13
Real Rate  of Return
9 N.A  N A  5 9  7.8  3.9  0.0  2,8  (0 8)  2.9  4.1  3.9  (0.2)  1.2  2.9  (031)
Rate  of'returin - Insurance funds
Implicit  interest rate
Real rate of return
Note: N.A:  Not Available
Sources  : Calculated  from:  CPF Annual  reports,  various  years;  Republic  of Singapore,  Dept. of Statistics,  Yearbook  of Statistics,  various  years.  Monetary  Authority  of Singapore,
Annual  Report,  various  issues.REFERENCES
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Summary  Findings
Singapore's  formal  pension  system  includes  several  elements  including
a non-contributory  public  employees  scheme  and  social  assistance  for
the  elderly.  The  main  source  of  mandatory  retirement  savings  however,
is  the  Central  Provident  Fund  or CPF  which  also  includes  a  variety  of
other  forced  savings  programs  covering  housing,  medical  savings  and
other  social  objectives.  This  paper  focuses  on  the  defined  contribution
scheme  whose  role  it is  to  provide  income  during  retirement.  Despite
a high  level  of  service  and  efficiency,  the  CPF  has  historically  generated
low  returns  to individuals  under  a centralized  and  opaque  investment
regime.  This  threatens  to leave  many  old  persons  in  Singapore  with
insufficient  savings  when  they  retire.  Recent  initiatives  to  allow
contracting  out  of  the  investment  with  unit  trusts  and  liberalization  of
investment  rules  may  eventually  provide  the  risk-return  combination
required  for  a funded  pension  scheme.  At  the  same  time,  a public
information  campaign  and  a strengthening  of  regulations  will help
ensure  that  individuals  are  able  to  take  advantage  of  these  reforms.
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